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This article was originally written in December 1998. In the interim, the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has ruled on the appeal filed by the Mountain
States Legal Foundation, on behalf of the Bear Lodge Multiple Use Associa-
tion. In the opinion, filed on April 26, 1999, the Tenth Circuit held that the
climbers who originally filed suit lacked standing. Specifically, the Court
stated: "Because they have alleged no injury as a result of their claim the
FMCP improperly establishes religion, we hold the Climbers have no standing
to sue in this case."'
Moreover, the Court, in disposing of the case on grounds of standing,
avoided addressing the constitutional issues that this article addresses:
Therefore, we do not reach either Climbers' argument the FCMP
establishes religion or the Secretary's response that the plan was
designed, in part, to eliminate barriers to American Indians' free
practice of religion and such accommodation is appropriate in
situations like this where the impediments arise because the sacred
place of worship is found on property of the United States
As such, this most recent Bear Lodge decision appears to render the case
ripe for a potential Supreme Court grant of certiorari, should another appeal
follow. Given the considerable lack of Supreme Court guidance directly
addressing the issue of sacred site protection on federal public lands, it would
appear that Bear Lodge would avail the Court a unique opportunity to
delineate precisely how the religion clauses of the First Amendment should
decide the issues raised by this case. It is this article's contention that the
time-honored affirmative mandate of accommodation of religion can by fully
honored in this case, while at the same time remaining well within the
permissible bounds of the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
* Associate, Likens & Blomquist, P.A., P.C., Prairie Village, Kan. J.D.. 1999, University
of Nebraska College of Law; B.A. 1996, University of Notre Dame.
First-place winner, 1998-99 American Indian Law Review writing competition.
1. Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n v. Babbitt, 175 F.3d 814, 822 (10th Cir. 1999).
2. Id.
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L Introduction
Where dogma lies at the heart of Western religions, Native
American faith is inextricably bound to the use of land. The site-
specific nature of Indian religious practice derives from the
Native American perception that land is itself a sacred, living
being.?
This excerpt from Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion in Lyng v.
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective.Ass'n' underscores the centrality of
sacred land to the spiritual lives of Native Americans. Yet, Justice Brennan's
words are clearly in the minority. He alone takes the time to scrutinize the
particular Native American faith at issue in an attempt to ascertain its
relevance, both to the case at bar, as well as to the lives of practicing Native
Americans everywhere. His words and sentiments reflect an awareness of the
considerable differences between Native American spirituality and Western
religiou; thought, and the impact those differences should have on our legal
system. Moreover, his words express the cyclical and all-encompassing nature
of Native American spirituality, recognizing that areas of life considered
fundamentally separate and distinct in Western religions are an all-
encompassing amalgam in the Native American vision: "Thus, for most
Native Americans, '[t]he area of worship cannot be delineated from social,
political, cultur[al], and other areas o[f] Indian lifestyle.""'S
At the center of most Native American belief systems is the basic tenet that
religion and faith draws heavily upon sacred lands. Land is, as Justice
Brennan notes, a living being. As such, courts would do well to heed Justice
Brennan's delineation of the paramount importance of sacred land to every
aspect of Native American life, not just religion. The pervasiveness of
spirituality has fueled many Native Americans to be increasingly assertive in
exercising their sovereignty. Specifically, they are "demanding that agencies
such as the Park Service treat them like living cultures, not dead ones."6
Once the federal government grasps the idea that Native American land is part
of the rich tapestry that binds tribal members together as well as an actual,
living being in the minds of Native Americans. The relief sought by sacred
site protection advocates may finally be realized.
3. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protection Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 460-61 (1988)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
4. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
5. Id. at 459-60.
6. Chris Smith & Elizabeth Manning, The Sacred and the Profane Collide in the West, HIGH
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In considering the law regarding Native American sacred site protection on
public lands, in terms of the applicability of the First Amendment's
Establishment Clause, courts and scholars should be vigilant in recalling the
Framers' intent behind the Establishment Clause. The Framers intended the
Establishment Clause to "guarantee a separation of church and state that
would prevent the persecution of religious minorities."7 At the same time, the
separation of church and state was intended to encourage "a vibrant, but
private sphere of religiously-motivated activity."8 As Native Americans have
suffered tremendous blows to their way of life over the course of United
States' history, Native Americans are owed the respect which the Framers
intended under the Establishment Clause. Justice Brennan's words in his
dissent in Lyng speak admirably to this issue. Those in a position to enhance
protection of Native American sacred sites should heed those words.
This comment attempts to address some of the key issues raised when
considering Native American sacred site protection on federal public lands.
This comment illustrates the ongoing litigation concerning land in northeast
Wyoming known to Lakota, Dakota, and Nakota Sioux as "Mateo Tepee," or
"Mato Tipila," which means "Bear Lodge" or "Bear's Lodge." To most of the
Western world, this area is known as Devil's Tower. After a brief comparison
of some of the basic tenets of Native American and Christian belief systems,
the analysis turns to applicable First Amendment Free Exercise and
Establishment Clause jurisprudence. From the basis of the Establishment
Clause, the comment addresses the issues at play in Bear Lodge, examining
how Establishment Clause jurisprudence has determined and continues to
determine the federal approach to sacred site protection. Finally, the comment
focuses upon the current situation involving a sacred Native American site on
federal public land - Rainbow Bridge, in Utah. This, along with many other
situations, is a context in which federal public land managers are attempting
to lay the policy groundwork for the future, while at the same time trying to
comport with a vague area of the law.
No Supreme Court case law exists which directly addresses the
applicability of the Establishment Clause to sacred site protection. Also, the
Establishment Clause is the chief barrier to the passage of a general sacred
lands statute. These two factors taken together seem to result in a "Catch-22"
for sacred site protection advocates. The concluding section of this comment
addresses the future of sacred site protection in terms of accommodation and
the federal-tribal trust relationship, as well analyze how the Bear Lodge and
Rainbow Bridge cases are constitutional examples of successful compliance
with the affirmative mandate of accommodation of Native American religion.
7. Raymond Cross & Elizabeth Brenneman, Devils Tower at the Crossroads: The National
Park Service and the Preservation of Native American Cultural Resources in the 21st Century,
18 Pun. LAND & REsouRcEs L. REv. 5, 37 (1997).
8. Id.
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II. A Context for Sacred Site Protection
What precise roles do sacred sites serve in the Native American way of
life? Sacred sites are conduits through which Native Americans are able to
channel the physical and spiritual manifestations of their beliefs. This sacred
connection runs the risk of federal regulation when a specific sacred site is
located on federal public land:
These sacred lands can be the places where traditional ceremonies
or other important rituals occur, or where spiritual power
emanates. Sacred lands are found within areas now designated as
national parks and monuments, national forests, and on other
public lands managed by federal agencies. Unfortunately, agency
decisions authorizing the use or development of public lands can
harm, or even destroy the attributes that make such lands sacred,
and in so doing, diminish the ability of Indians to practice their
religions
Because of the inherent tension between the Free Exercise Clause and the
Establishment Clause, as well as that between the Establishment Clause and
the policy of accommodation, the degree of protection which Native American
sacred sites on federal land will receive in any given situation is unclear. In
the wake of such uncertainty, many Native American advocates have urged
for stronger, more clearly articulated standards. As a result, the Establishment
Clause Presents a formidable hurdle for any truly effective sacred site
legislation.
Some commentators urge that Native American sacred site protection,
irrespective of the Establishment Clause, has been extremely hard to come by
for two distinct reasons:
Fiist, commentators have cited the United States' perceived sense
of cultural inferiority to their European cousins as deterring any
concerted legislative action to preserve our young nation's historic
and cultural heritage from destruction....
Second, the Americans of that era did not generally value
contemporary Native American ceremonial practices and traditions
as cultural resources that were worth preserving as an
irreplaceable part of our shared natural heritage."0
9. Ldia T. Grimm, Sacred Lands and the Establishment Clause: Indian Religious Practices
on Federal Lands, 12 NAT. REsOURCES & ENV'" 19, 19 (1997).




As a result of these realities, those in positions to influence and promulgate
sacred site protection legislation have been extremely reluctant to do so. One
federal agency, the National Park Service, has been entrusted with protecting
federal public land, ajob whichrequires a delicate balancing of the competing
interests of recreation and preservation."
Given these long-standing difficulties in preserving and protecting sacred
sites, it is essential to grasp the difficulties a federal land manager faces when
he or she attempts to regulate the use of federal public lands. An appropriate
balance between recreation and preservation must be established. Similarly,
in the case of Native American sacred sites, a balance between the Free
Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause must be struck. Considering the
government's traditional lack of zeal in protecting sacred sites, coupled with
the ambiguities of First Amendment jurisprudence, the federal land manager's
job is an unenviable one. In spite of this difficulty, our federal decisional law
mandates accommodation of religion. "
IL. Native American and Christian Faiths: A Brief Comparison
An examination of the basic underpinnings of both Native American and
Western, Christian faiths is essential to the understanding of the basic issues
involved in sacred site protection. Such theoretical bases underscore the
history of our courts' treatment of the issue of sacred site protection to
markedly different degrees.
Inherent in any thorough analysis of Native American law is a fundamental
understanding of the many roles which religion plays in the Native American
way of life. Rather than impacting a discrete sphere, religion encompasses all
aspects of a Native American's being. It is arguably the truest expression of
a Native American's culture and heritage. Moreover, it is of particular
relevance when analyzing the legal system's impact on Native American
cultures.
It is important to understand at the outset that there is no "one" Native
American religion, given the multitude of tribes in existence. There is a wide
variance in specific types of Native American religious beliefs.'3 Also, the
perspective from which Native Americans view religion is diametrically
opposed to that of Western Christian faiths: "Native Americans typically view
religion more in terms of culture than in terms of what most Americans
consider religion. Notably, no traditional Native American language has one
word that could translate to 'religion.' For Native Americans, the spiritual life
is not separate from the secular life."'" Anyone involved in Native American
11. d. at 19.
12. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
13. Anastasia P. Winslow, Sacred Standards: Honoring the Establishment Clause in
Protecting Native American Sacred Sites. 38 ARtz. L. REv. 1291, 1295 (1996).
14. Id.
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law must remain cognizant of the fact that it is very easy to fail to notice the
deleterious long-term effects of the imposition of our legal, moral, and ethical
tenets upon the Native American way of life. The respect for other religions
inherent in the Framers' intent behind the Establishment Clause is often lost
in the shuffle of litigation over sacred sites.
Specifically, Native American faiths depart from Christian beliefs on
fundamental issues such as "God, human nature, the environment, time and
space, individuality,. . . and universal truths."'" When analyzed, it is readily
apparent how many of the religious and philosophical underpinnings of the
American legal system have dealt tremendous blows to the very fabric and
essence of the Native American way of life. As Anastasia Winslow
discovered in her study, Christian faith is couched in terms of several
fundamental beliefs:
In sum, there are inherent conflicts between Christian and Native
American faiths, most notably as they relate to the environment.
Under Christian teachings, God is identified with a male human
form; animals are placed beneath humans on a hierarchical scale;
the natural world is considered a place to be controlled and
dominated (whether for the sake of industrialization or protection
as. stewards); and time is viewed linearly, such that process and
development are associated with progress. Also, these views are
considered universal human truths, such than non-adherents may
be. condemned and considered needy of conversion to achieve
salvation. 6
Conversely, typical Native American beliefs underscore a way of life foreign
to most Christian adherents:
Native Americans, on the other hand, define the Great Spirit in
terms of an indefinable presence that is connected to the natural
world; they consider animals and nature as godly, with the natural
world reflecting a place of gods, spirits, and life on an equal, if
not superior, level to human beings; they apply a cyclical
perspective of time, seeking to maintain a natural order; and they
do not expect all peoples to adhere to their views. They also
stress community life and involvement, as opposed to individual
relations with one's God.'
7
These fundamentally distinct belief systems have clashed for hundreds of
years, with the battles played out both on the Native Americans' aboriginal
lands, and in the federal courts. The Christian motivation to convert the
15. Id. at 1295-1301.





"savage" and "heathen" Indians to the more "enlightened" views of Western
religions has robbed Native Americans of both physical land as well as
spiritual sanctity. Winslow observes that "a subtle connection has existed as
well, affecting property rules and other laws and governmental policies that
have had the effect of dispossessing Native Americans of their sacred
sites."" In light of a history of attempts to eradicate the Native American
way of life through such government-endorsed policies as allotment and
assimilation, substantive law has shaped Native American sacred site
protection on federal public lands.
IV. Free Exercise Law Applicable to Sacred Site Protection
The law pertaining to Native American sacred site protection is one
characterized by tension between the dual mandates of the First Amendment's
"religion clauses," the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause.
The first sentence of the First Amendment reads: "Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof, ....",19 Although the focus of sacred site protection has shifted from
the Free Exercise Clause to the Establishment Clause over the last ten years,
it is nonetheless necessary to ascertain the role of the Free Exercise Clause
in this area of Native American law.
The Supreme Court has established a "compelling interest test" to deal with
Free Exercise challenges. The test states that any government action that
burdens the free exercise of religion is prohibited unless that government
action furthers a compelling governmental interest.' The holdings of four
key cases2 have led some commentators to bemoan the death of the Free
Exercise Clause as an effective defender of Native American rights to sacred
sites on federal public lands:
The Sherbert analysis suggests that government actions that harm
sacred lands, and thereby burden Indian religious beliefs, are
prohibited under the Free Exercise Clause. Indians found,
however, that the courts were not willing to interpret the Free
Exercise Clause to prohibit government actions harming sacred
lands, despite significant impacts to religious practices and
beliefs.'
18. Id. at 1308.
19. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
20. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
21. See Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 953 (1980); Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953
(1980); Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 956 (1983); Lyng v.
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
22. Grimm, supra note 9, at 19-20.
No. 1]
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Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Authorit? involved construction of a dam
which caused flooding of sacred Native American land. However, because
this land was not found by the court to be "central" or "indispensable" to the
Native American religious practices involved, the Court denied relief on Free
Exercise grounds. Furthermore, in Badoni v. Higginson,2 the court refused
to protect another sacred site from the adverse effects of dam construction
because the court found the government's compelling interest in the federal
land dam construction to be superior to that of the Native Americans. The
variance between this compelling interest test as applied to Native Americans
and non-Native Americans prompted one commentator to note this disparate
treatment:
In the sacred-site cases, however, the substantial burden standard
was heightened. Courts required Native Americans to come
forward with factual proof that the sites were central and
indispensable to their religions, that is, that their religions could
not be practiced without them. However, as applied to Western
religions, the centrality test had been rejected, and claimants were
protected from even indirect burdens on their religious
practices.
As Winslow notes, the effective end of Free Exercise protection of Native
American sacred sites was soon to follow.
The United States Supreme Court, in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery
Protecrive Ass'n, also addressed the Free Exercise issue. In Lyng, the Forest
Service was preparing to harvest timber in the "high country" of northwest
California, sacred to Yurok, Karok, and Tolowa Indians.' Moreover, the
Forest Service also planned to construct a road that would run near a sacred
site. Despite lower court rulings in favor of the Native Americans, the
Supreme Court held that the Free Exercise Clause did not prohibit the Forest
Service's actions, because the government programs at issue were sufficiently
compelling:
T1his does not and cannot imply that incidental effects of
government programs, which may make it more difficult to
practice certain religions but which have no tendency to coerce
individuals into acting contrary to their religious beliefs, require
23. 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980).
24. 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980).
25. Bedoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172, 177 nA (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953
(1980).
26. Winslow, supra note 13, at 1313.
27. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).




government to bring forward a compelling justification for its
otherwise lawful actions."
The Court's ruling effectively ended any possibilities of successful Native
American sacred site challenges under the Free Exercise Clause.
Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion, though it did not suggest any
wholesale solution to the issue of Native American sacred site protection, is
nonetheless deserving of serious scrutiny. Not only does Justice Brennan
foreshadow the Establishment Clause litigation to come,' but he also
forcefully and eloquently articulates the frustration of the Native American
people in the aftershock of Lyng. He argues that the Court's decision in
Wisconsin v. Yoder,3' which invalidated a compulsory public school
attendance policy under the Free Exercise Clause because of the coercive
effects it would have on nearby Amish communities, was analogous to the
case at bar: "Admittedly, this threat arose from the compulsory nature of the
law at issue, but it was the impact on religious practice itself, not the source
of that impact, that led us to invalidate the law."' Moreover, he argues that
the inevitable destruction of this aspect of the respondent Native Americans
is something which clearly merits even more protection than the interests
safeguarded in Yoder.
Here, in stark contrast, respondents have claimed - and proved
that the desecration of the high country will prevent religious
leaders from attaining the religious power or medicine indispensable
to the success of virtually all their rituals and ceremonies.... Here
the threat posed by the desecration of sacred lands that are
indisputably essential to respondents' religious practices is both
more direct and more substantial than that raised by a compulsory
school law that simply exposed Amish children to an alien value
system?3
Further, aside from the specific Free Exercise questions raised, Justice
Brennan is also singularly cognizant of the different value and belief systems
which underscore the European American and Native American ways of life.
In foreshadowing cases like Bear Lodge, he is aware of the effects of these
fundamental differences on concepts like property rights and the legal system,
and he chastises the Court for failing to address this inescapable issue:
In addition, the nature of respondents' site-specific religious
practices raises the specter of future suits in which Native
29. ld. at 450-51.
30. Id. at 476 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
31. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
32. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 467.
33. Id. at 467-68.
No. 1]
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Americans seek to exclude all human activity from such areas.
These concededly legitimate concerns lie at the very heart of this
case, which represents yet another stress point in the longstanding
conflict between two disparate cultures - the dominant Western
culture, which views land in terms of ownership and use, and that
of Native Americans, in which concepts of private property are not
only alien, but contrary to a belief system that hold land sacred.
Rather than address this conflict in any meaningful fashion,
however, the Court disclaims all responsibility for balancing these
competing and potentially irreconcilable interests, choosing instead
to turn this difficult task over to the Federal Legislature.... In my
view, however, Native Americans deserve - and the Constitution
demands - more than this.'
Prefiguring the accommodation issue, Justice Brennan contends that because
these fundamentally opposite systems of belief can never be fully reconciled
with eazh other, compromise is essential to any evenhanded constitutional
analysis.3
Despite Justice Brennan's moving and persuasive words, Lyng has forced
Native Americans seeking protection of their sacred sites to turn to the
Establishment Clause as the primary source of constitutional protection.
V. Establishment Clause Law Applicable to Sacred Site Protection
At the heart of Establishment Clause jurisprudence, as it pertains to sacred
site protection, is the concept of accommodation. It is accommodation which
has kept hope alive for sacred site protection, ensuring that the federal
government applies the Establishment Clause impartially and evenhandedly.
Specifically, "the fact that neutral land management decisions cannot create
a burden on free exercise does not relieve agencies of their obligation to
accommodate Indian religious practices. To the contrary, the Constitution
'affirmatively mandates accommodation, not merely tolerance, of all
religions."'" Even in ruling against the Native American parties in Lyng, the
case did mention that accommodation of Native American religious interests
should not be discouraged?7 Courts must be cognizant of the fact that such
accommodation will necessarily involve a balancing of interests. The Free
Exercise rights of the Native Americans, and important governmental interests
must both be accommodated while making sure not to violate the
Establishment Clause.
34. fLt at 473.
35. Id. at 474.
36. Grimm, supra note 9, at 21 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984)).




The Supreme Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence has not been
clear. Much of the confusion is due to the fact that the Court has employed
different tests, while never explicitly overruling previous tests. The Lemon
test, the coercion test, and the endorsement test play a vital role in shaping
Native American sacred site protection. Depending on which test, or tests, a
court adopts, Native Americans can be accorded more or less First
Amendment protections. As such, each test must be considered in order to
determine whether a particular Native American sacred site on federal public
land will be protected.
Traditionally, courts have relied on the Lemon test, articulated in Lemon
v. Kurtzman3 Though the test has been subjected to harsh scrutiny and
criticisms in the past decade, it has never been explicitly overruled and is still
good law. According to the test, "a government action violates the
Establishment Clause unless (1) it has a secular purpose; (2) its principal
effect neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) it does not foster an
'excessive government entanglement with religion."3"
The two most important components of the test are the first and second
prongs. Under the first prong, it is crucial to note that governmental actions
or policies which seek to serve the stated goal of accommodation are
sufficiently secular to pass this part of the test.4 Under the second prong,
government action must directly sponsor or further religious activity. Actions
which neither advance nor inhibit religion are acceptable'
A second test, articulated by Justice Kennedy in Lee v. Weisman, 2 asks
"whether or not the accommodation has the effect of coercing persons into
conforming their practices with those of a particular religion."'43 This
"coercion test" has been applied by courts both as a supplement to Lemon, as
well as a substitute for it. The thrust of the coercion test is its focus on the
context of the particular government action. As such, a prayer read by a
chaplain at the beginning of a state legislature session did not violate the
Establishment Clause under the coercion test." Yet, where a prayer was read
at a state-sponsored high school graduation ceremony, the coercion test did
result in an Establishment Clause violation!'
The third test, the "endorsement test," as first promulgated by Justice
O'Connor in her concurring opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly, holds that
38. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
39. Grimm, supra note 9, at 21.
40. Cross & Brenneman, supra note 7, at 29 (citing Corporation of Presiding Bishop of the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987)).
41. ld.
42. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
43. Grimm, supra note 9, at 21.
44. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786-95 (1983).
45. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 596-99 (1992).
46. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
No. 1]
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government actions which send messages "to non-adherents that they are
outsiders,"'47 and "to adherents that they are insiders"" violates the
Establishment Clause. According to one commentator, "Justice O'Connor's
endorsement standard would prohibit only those governmental acts that
actively promote or advantage particular religious organizations or politically
privilege a particular set of religious beliefs."49
Depending on the type of test chosen by a particular court, Native
American litigants attempting to protect their sacred sites must be certain to
craft their arguments in ways that are capable of best satisfying each test.
Each test presents its own unique hurdles, as one commentator notes:
The Lemon test's "secular purpose prong is particularly hard to
overcome when the activity in question is designed to
accommodate religion, as is the second prong requiring that the
principal effect of the government action not "advance" religion.
Similarly, neutrality may be a difficult principle to adhere to when
the accommodation is for specific Indian sacred sites and
practices on federal land.... The endorsement test may be the
easiest to meet, provided it is not limited to religious symbols
placed in public for a, because an accommodation of Indian
religious practices does not necessarily demonstrate an
"endorsement" of Indian religion, but rather it demonstrates
compliance with the principles embodied in AIRFA.-
As such, on top of the loss of the effectiveness of the Free Exercise argument
in the wake of Lyng, Native American litigants must also cope with the
additional uncertainty of which substantive standard a court will apply in
considering a sacred site challenge.
Considering the numerous issues raised by the Establishment Clause
approach, an analysis of Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n v. Babbitt' - a
case currently on appeal - helps not only to examine the theoretical
underpinnings of this area of the law, but also to aid in determining the most
efficacious solution to sacred site protection. After focusing on the factual
context that gave rise to the litigation, the analysis will shift towards the
impact of the Supreme Court's general Establishment Clause jurisprudence on
that case, as well as on future cases.
47. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 69 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment) (citing
Lynch, 455 U.S. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
48. Id.
49. Cross & Brenneman, supra note 7, at 33 (citing Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village
v. Grumt, 512 U.S. 687, 712-21 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment)).
50. Grimm, supra note 9, at 21-22.




VI. Background of the Bear Lodge Litigation
Located in northeast Wyoming, Devil's Tower was named our country's
first national monument by President Theodore Roosevelt in 1906, pursuant
to the Antiquities Act.' It was given the name "Devil's Tower" by a team
of scientists on an expedition to the area in violation of Indian treaty rights5
This imposing structure, formed from the core of an ancient volcano, was
called "Mateo Tepee" by Native Americans, meaning "Bear Lodge."' It is
sacred to several Native American tribes, including the Lakota, Dakota, and
Nakota Sioux. According to the Native American legend, the Tower got its
name in a way far different than that utilized by the American scientists:
A troy was transformed into a bear, the legend says, and chased
his seven sisters, who took refuge on a large stump. In response
to their prayers, the stump grew, and the bear raked its side with
his claws - producing the tower's distinctive columns. Stranded
on the summit, the girls died, and ascended into the sky to
become the stars of the Big Dipper.5
During the month of June, the Lakota and other tribes gather to perform their
"Sun Dance," in order to commemorate the summer solstice, a spiritual time
of power for the Sioux.' The Sun Dance is one of the most important
expressions of these tribes' faith, According to Greg Bourland, president of
the Cheyenne River Sioux tribe, "The Lakotas, for about 10,000 to 12,000
years, performed an annual Sun Dance at Devils Tower" - a dance which
Bourland cites as the most important of the seven Lakota ceremonies.'
Ironically, the Sun Dance was singled out in a 1921 federal policy attempting
to eradicate Native American culture entirely:
The sun-dance, and all other similar dances and so-called religious
ceremonies are considered "Indian offences" under existing
regulations, and corrective penalties are provided. I regard such
restrictions as applicable to any dance which . . . involves the
reckless giving away of property . . . frequent or prolonged
periods of celebration .. . in fact any disorderly or plainly
excessive performance that promotes superstitious cruelty,




55. Karen J. Coates, Stairway to Heaven: When a Climbing Mecca Is Also a Sacred Site,
SIERRA, Nov. 21, 1996, at 27 (vol. 81, no. 6), available in LEXIS, News Library, ASAPII File.
56. George Snyder, Devil's Tower Climbers Suing over Government's Ban, S.F. CHRON.,
June 21, 1996, at All.
57. Candy Hamilton, One Man's Rock lsAnothers Holy Site, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June
12, 1996, at 4, available in LEXIS, News Library, CSM File.
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licentiousness, idleness, danger to health, and shiftless indifference
to family welfare.'
Aside from its prominent appearance in the Steven Spielberg film, "Close
Encounters of the Third Kind," the Tower has made a name for itself in a
different milieu, rock climbing. The cracks on the Tower, attributed to the
Native American legend of the bear clawing at the Tower, have become a big
draw for those interested in the best "crack climbing" in the world.
According to statistics, the number of climbers of the Tower each year has
grown to over 6000.' Over the past several years, this dramatic increase in
the number of climbers at the Tower has manifested itself in several notable
distractions to Native American ceremonies and rituals, most notably the
Lakota Sun Dance in June. Problems arose when Native Americans using
Bear Lodge complained about, among other things, the disrupting noise made
by climbers and their gear, as well as the adverse environmental impact of
new bolts and trails:
"We can hear them (the climbers) cussing and shouting. Sound
really carries from that high," says a Lakota woman who has led
a religious ceremony at the tower for the past 10 years. "The
tower looks trashy with abandoned pitons and ropes, some
fluorescent. It's not treated respectfully. We have no contact with
them, but the attitude overflows," she says.'
Moreover, many Native American elders worry about the ability of the
tribes to educate their children in their traditional ways in light of such
interference. In some of the initial Bear Lodge testimony, Lakotas testified
that "they cannot teach their children respect for their religion when they go
to the summer ceremonies if they see people 'playing' on such an important
shrine." In light of the growing number of contemporary Native Americans
turning away from their traditional cultures, such teachings are imperative to
the survival of those proud traditions. "'This is very important to Indian
people, especially at a time when even the dominant society sees the need for
more spirituality and family values,' said Elaine Quiver, a Lakota member of
the Gray Eagle Society, a spiritually traditional group."' In today's tribal
society, in large part due to a simple lack of funds, sacred site protection is
58. DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL. CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 754 (4th
ed. 1998) (quoting FELIX COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 175 (Univ. of N.M.
Press 1971) (1942)).
59. Tim Carrier, Wyoming Cultures Clash at Devil's Tower, DENVER PoST, Nov. 17, 1996,
at 30, available in News Library, DPOST File.
60. Bear Lodge, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 1450 n.l.
61. Id.
62. Id.




often relegated to the back burner: "Many tribes face more immediate
concerns, such as federal recognition, economic development, or attacks on
their budgets or sovereignty rights by the current U.S. Congress. Many are
still struggling for the basic needs of housing, health care and education.'"
Commentators echo these sentiments, as well as add new insight as to the
resurgence in interest in protecting these sacred sites:
The Native Americans' demand for cultural access to Devils
Tower may reflect two significant trends in contemporary Indian
Country. First, many Native American communities have sought
to re-vitalize their traditional Native American ceremonial values
and practices as a means of combatting significant social
problems among their members, such drug or alcohol abuse.
Second, Native American youth in both reservation and urban
settings have re-asserted their interest in understanding and
participating in their once suppressed Native American cultural
and ceremonial heritage.'
Amidst these simmering concerns, the National Park Service (NPS) decided
to take some action. Deborah Liggett, Superintendent of Devil's Tower
National Monument, like any other federal land manager, is given wide
discretion in making decisions concerning the land.' That discretion must
be considered when deciding how to balance the interests of the Native
American sacred sites, the climbers of the Tower, and the environmental
impacts of climbing upon the Tower. In 1995, under the direction of Ms.
Liggett, and after exhaustive consultation with affected groups, the NPS issued
a Final Climbing Management Plan (FCMP) to address the concerns resulting
from climbers at the Tower. Specifically, the FCMP stated, according to the
court's summary:
The FCMP "sets a new direction for managing climbing activity
at the tower for the next three to five years," its stated purpose
being, "to protect the natural and cultural resources of Devils
Tower and to provide for visitor enjoyment and appreciation of
this unique feature." To protect against any new physical impacts
to the tower, the FCMP provides that no new bolts or fixed pitons
will be permitted on the tower, and new face routes requiring new
bolt installation will not be permitted. The FCMP does allow
individuals to replace already existing bolts and fixed pitons. In
addition, the plan calls for access trails to be rehabilitated and
maintained, and requires camouflaged climbing equipment, and
64. Smith & Manning, supra note 6.
65. Cross & Brenneman, supra note 7, at 22.
66. Id. at 24.
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climbing routes to be closed seasonally to protect raptor nests.
The FCMP further provides that "[i]n respect for the reverence
many American Indians hold for Devils Tower as a sacred site,
rock climbers will be asked to voluntarily refrain from climbing
on Devils Tower during the culturally significant month of
June.",
Moreover, concerning enforcement and future plans, the Court also
summarizes the FCMP's primary effects:
The NPS represents that it will not enforce the voluntary closure,
but will instead rely on the climbers' self-regulation and a new
"cross-cultural educational program" "to motivate climbers and
other park visitors to comply." The NPS has also placed a sign at
the base of the Tower in order to encourage visitors to stay on the
trail surrounding the Tower. Despite the FCMP's reliance on self-
regulation, it also provides that if the voluntary closure proves to
be "unsuccessful," the NPS will consider taking several actions
including: (a) revising the climbing management plan; (b)
reconvening a climbing management plan work group; (c)
instituting additional measures to further encourage compliance;
(d) change the duration and nature of the voluntary closure; (e)
converting the June closure to mandatory; and (f) writing a new
definition of success for the voluntary closure. Factors indicating
an unsuccessful voluntary closure include, little to no decrease in
the number of climbers, an increase in the number of unregistered
climbers and increased conflict between user groups in the park.
The NPS, however, states that the voluntary closure will be "fully
successful" only "when every climber personally chooses not to
climb at Devils Tower during June out of respect for American
Indian cultural values."6'
Additionally, one final aspect of the FCMP sparked the initial litigation.
The original FCMP "contained a provision stating that commercial use
licenses for June climbing guide activities would not be issued by the NPS for
the month of June."' This commercial climbing ban, along with the rest of
the FCMP, was challenged by a group of local climbers and climbing tour
guides.
67. Bear Lodge, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 1449-50.





VII. Bear Lodge Litigation
As the litigation began, the Lakota, Dakota, and Nakota Sioux were
anticipating the 1996 summer solstice as one of the most important in the
histories of the respective tribes. "According to their spiritual traditions, this
is a time when the Sacred Hoop of the Sioux - and, by extension, harmony
for all people - is to be mended after seven generations of oppression and
environmental degradation that they believe threatens all humanity."70 As
such, a great deal hung in the balance.
Though most climbers respected the voluntary June ban, Andy Petefish, the
owner of Tower Guides (a commercial climbing guides service adjacent to the
Tower), brought the litigation challenging the FCMP. On behalf of Petefish,
other climbers, and the Bear Lodge Multiple Use Association (representing
timber, mining and ranching interests), the Mountain States Legal Foundation
(MSLF), a conservative organization, commenced the litigation."' The basis
of the suit was that the FCMP was an unconstitutional government action in
violation of the First Amendment.
The MSLF argued that the FCMP was a coercive violation of the
Establishment Clause, and that the accommodation of Native American
religion simply went too far. William Perry Pendley, an attorney for the
MSLF, said that, "Many people feel having the government say we should
bend on the knee of fealty at this place is blasphemous."' Andy Petefish,
after seeing his business' income drop one third after the closure,' was
unsympathetic to the Native American arguments: 'No one is stopping Native
Americans from performing ceremonies or anything else. If they find offense
and don't like all the noise they just have to live with it."74 Finally, Todd
Welch, another MSLF attorney, argued that the FCMP equated to 'receiving
preferential treatment on federal lands.... I don't think they have a right to
solitude."7
Conversely, the Native Americans argued that the issue hinged on respect
of the religious beliefs of others, and that the FCMP was a permissible
measure of accommodation under the First Amendment. Superintendent
Deborah Liggett was acutely aware of the significance of land to Native
American religious practice. The Lakota and other tribes argued that the
FCMP was necessary to teach its own people about Native American heritage.
70. Snyder, supra note 56.
71. Id.
72. Christopher Smith, Park Service's Sacred-Ground Rule Stands But Policy Hav Lots of
Nonbelievers: Seeking Religious Respect at Parks Is OK, Judge Says, SALT LAKE TRIB., May 3,
1998, at Al, available in News Library, SLTRIB File.
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Steven Gunn, an attorney for the Indian Law Resource Center, argued that,
"This situation is no different than what other government agencies do on
other federal property. For example, recreational activities are not allow [sic]
at Arlington National Cemetery during religious ceremonies."' Moreover,
Mr. Gunn contended that "there are countless churches and chapels on
government lands that, when services are taking place, disruptive activities are
simply not allowed."' Finally, Cheyenne lawyers have argued that, "twice
a year at Tumacacori National Historic Park in Arizona, the Park Service
sponsors a Catholic mass reenacting 18th century religious traditions."'"
Initially, the court was confronted with the plaintiffs' motion for a
preliminary injunction to bar the FCMP's provision involving the mandatory
ban on commercial climbing in the month of June. Citing the Plaintiffs'
complaint, as well as the Order issued by the presiding Judge (Judge
Downes), Professor Raymond Cross described the ruling in his recent law
review article:
Judge Downes ruled the prohibition of commercial guides violates
the Establishment Clause, and found that the proposal to close
Devils Tower to all climbing in June, if the voluntary closure fails
to significantly reduce climbing, amounted to a threat that was
governmentally coercive of individual action and conduct in favor
of Native American religious activities."
In decrying that decision, Cross argues that Judge Downes relied too heavily
on Lyng,9 and not at all on the applicable Establishment Clause caselaw.",
In his opposition to Judge Downes' ruling on the preliminary injunction,
Cross goes on to articulate how the case would have come out under the
Establishment Clause, had Judge Downes properly utilized it. He argues that
Superintendent Liggetts accommodation in the FCMP passes constitutional
muster under the Lemon test, ' as well as under the coercion and
76. Paul Richardson, Devil's Tower: A Religious Mecca, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (LAKOTA
TIMES), Aug. 3, 1998, at A6, available in Westlaw, 1998 WL 18037226.
77. Id.
78. Smith & Manning, supra note 6.
79. Cross & Brenneman, supra note 7, at 27.
80. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 459 (1988).
81. Cross & Brenneman, supra note 7, at 28. Specifically, Cross argues that Judge Downes
made three errors: (1) he failed to apply Lemon; (2) he failed to apply the coercion test or the
endorsement test; and (3) he utilized solely Free Exercise cases, while paying mere lip service
to the line of Establishment Clause caselaw. Id.
82. Id. at 30-31. Cross argues that there are clearly several secular purposes - namely,
protection of the environment and raptors, and management of recreation. Its strongest secular
purpose, however, is the fact that it is itself accommodation, a valid secular purpose in the eyes
of the Supreme Court; the second prong is satisfied, because the FCMP merely provides access
to the Tower, rather than advancing or inhibiting religion; finally, there is no government
entanglement in religion. Id.
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accommodationU Since accommodation is a valid secular purpose, the
FCMP satisfied the first prong of Lemon.'
In considering the second prong of Lemon, Judge Downes also mentions
Justice Kennedy's coercion test. In doing so, he looks at controlling Tenth
Circuit precedent, i.e., Badoni, to address whether the voluntary ban is
coercion such that the primary effect of the accommodation is the
advancement of religion. "If the NPS is, in effect, depriving individuals of
their legitimate use of the monument in order to enforce the tribes' rights to
worship, it has stepped beyond permissible accommodation and into the realm
of promoting religion."' Despite arguments by the plaintiffs that the
voluntary ban was voluntary "in name only" and coercive, the court held that
it is not coercive simply because of the goal of having all climbers adhere to
the voluntary ban. With this holding, the second prong of Lemon is
satisfied. ° Finally, the third prong is also satisfied, because the character and
purposes of the FCMP are such that the government is merely allowing
Native Americans "a more peaceful setting" in which to worship.9
In sum, Judge Downes upholds the validity of the amended FCMP:
[The voluntary climbing ban[] is a policy that has been carefully
crafted to balance the competing needs of individuals using
Devil's Tower National Monument while, at the same time,
obeying the edicts of the Constitution. As such, the plan
constitutes a legitimate exercise of the Secretary of the Interior's
discretion in managing the monument.
As amended, the FCMP is thus a constitutionally sound measure of
accommodation of Native American interests in a sacred site.
Only days after the decision, MSLF attorneys made it clear that they would
appeal. Moreover, they expressed confidence that the 10th Circuit Court of
Appeals would rule again against Native American interests, as they did in
Badoni: "'Frankly, this [appeal] is a slam dunk,' says Pendley, whose group
also has sued President Clinton over creation of the Grand Staircase-Escalante
National Monument in southern Utah. Tm very optimistic the 10th Circuit
will overturn this opinion. '
Since the U.S. Supreme Court has yet to directly rule on the Establishment
Clause as it applies to federal public land management of sacred sites, the
87. Id. at 1454.
88. Id. at 1455.
89. Id.
90. d. at 1455-56.
91. Id. at 1456. Judge Downes also states that since the tribes benefiting from the ban are
not solely religious groups, but also a group with common culture and heritage, there is less
danger of excessive government entanglement in solely religious activities.
92. Id. at 1456-57.
93. Smith, supra note 72.
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endorsement tests.Y Moreover, Cross argues that the FCMP is even
constitutional under the Free Exercise law of Lyng:
Superintendent Liggett's regulatory action implements the Lyng
decision by preserving the Native Americans' traditional cultural
access to a well-established sacred site at Devils Tower. Though
her action does represent a clear break with the majority culture's
traditional hostility to Native American culture and religion, it
also effectuates a permissible interpretation of her statutory
preservation duties consistent with the Lyng accommodation
principle. Public land managers may, under Lyng, consider Native
American cultural access to sacred sites in their revision of their
land use or management plans. Superintendent Liggett's action
shows that the federal government's ethnocentric disregard of
Native American culture and religion need not continue to rule the
National Park Service's decision-making process."
Professor Cross concludes with a proposal for a change in Native American
sacred site law, which addresses much of the Native American disappointment
after the preliminary injunction was granted.' However, in a decision handed
down in April of 1998, following the plaintiffs' submission of an amended
petition, Judge Downes upheld a slightly revised FCMP.
This recent decision dealt with the constitutionality of the voluntary ban on
climbing in June proposed by the FCMP, as well as the NPS' cultural
education programs and signs at Devil's Tower. The MSLF argued that the
FCMP, even without the commercial climbing ban, violated the Establishment
Clause. After holding that the Plaintiffs lacked standing to contest the
constitutionality of the FCMP,M Judge Downes turned to the Establishment
Clause issue. Following Tenth Circuit precedent that mandates that Circuit to
apply the Lemon test in conjunction with Justice O'Connor's endorsement test,
Judge Downes was quick to note Lynch's affirmative mandate of
83. Id. at 33. Cross states:
The proposed closure of Devils Tower violates neither the coercion nor the
endorsement test. Native American religious practitioners do not proselytize, nor
will their practices create a coercive environment that would cause spectators to
be compelled to participate. Moreover, the presence of Native Americans
performing religious ceremonies at Devils Tower could not reasonable cause
observers to feel as though Native Americans are full members of the political
community, but the spectators are not; thus, no governmental endorsement would
occur.
84. Cross & Brenneman, supra note 7, at 36.
85. See infra Part VIII.
86. Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n v. Babbitt, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1448, 1452-53 (1998), affd,




hope is that Bear Lodge will actually make its way to the Supreme Court and
set new precedent. In addition to the Supreme Court, legislative efforts and
law review scholarship also addressed the sacred site issue.
VIII. Legislative Efforts and Proposed Solutions
A. What Can Be Done Under Existing Legislation
Legislatively, there have been several attempts to counter the negative
effects of decisions such as Lyng. However, given the extremely daunting task
of crafting legislation that will accord with Establishment Clause principles,
the legislation that has passed has generally been of little practical import.
Under the current authority, Native Americans seeking sacred site protection
can utilize several separate legislative and executive tools, among them:
NHPA, NFMA, AIRFA, and recent Executive Orders from the Clinton
Administration.
Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA)," can be
utilized to protect sacred sites without regulating public use of the land or
mandating respect for Native American values. Under the NHPA, "agencies
must take into account the effect of their actions on properties that are eligible
for listing or are listed on the National Register of Historic Places."" In
determining whether a site will be considered a "traditional cultural property"
under the Act, the religious significance of a site is a significant factor.'
However, this Act is of doubtful efficacy on its own, given its inability to
prevent federal agencies that follow proper procedure from affecting sacred
sites.'
A second possible legislative tool for sacred site protection is the National
Forest Management Act (NFMA).9' The NFMA ensures that in planning land
management decisions, federal agencies must proffer a plan which seeks
Native American input at various stages of the process."
94. 16 U.S.C.A. § 470f (1994).
95. Grimm, supra note 9, at 24.
96. t.
97. Id. "TCP identification has helped to avoid unknowing impacts to sacred lands, where
Indians can reveal such information. TCP identification does not, however, prevent an agency
from adversely affecting such sites, so long as the agency has followed the correct processes and
considered the views of Indians. For that reason, TCP identification alone is not a particularly
effective mechanism to ensure protection of sacred sites, as agencies can, and do, decide to
proceed with projects despite impacts to TCPs."
98. 16 U.S.C. § 1604 (1994).
99. Id. Specifically, the Forest Service "coordinates with Indian tribes, gives consideration
to tribal objectives, and meets with tribes at various stages of the planning process. In addition,
forest planning requires the identification, protection, interpretation, and management of
significant cultural resources." Id. (citing 36 C.F.R. §§ 219.7,219.24 (1996)) (citations omitted).
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A third option, though often dismissed for its lack of enforcement "teeth,"
is the American Indian Religious Freedom Act (AIRFA).X In his dissenting
opinion in Lyng, Justice Brennan also gave a brief synopsis of the language
federal land managers and courts must comply with under AIRFA:
Indeed, in the American Indian Religious Freedom Act (AIRFA),
42 U.S.C. § 1996, Congress expressly recognized the adverse
impact land-use decisions and other governmental actions
frequently have on the site-specific religious practices of Native
Americans, and the Act accordingly directs agencies to consult
with Native American religious leaders before taking actions that
might impair those practices. Although I agree that the Act does
not create any judicially enforceable rights, see ante, at 1327-
1328, the absence of any private right of action in no way
undermines the statute's significance as an express congressional
determination that federal land management decisions are not
"internal" Government "procedures," but are instead governmental
actions that can and indeed are likely to burden Native American
religious practices. That such decisions should be subject to
constitutional challenge, and potential constitutional limitations,
should hardly come as a surprise.'
Much recent debate over sacred site protection seems to miss Justice
Brennan's point that even though there is no statutory cause of action created
by AIRFA, it is nonetheless mandatory that federal land managers view its
commands with the utmost seriousness. Opponents of sacred site protection
dismiss the act as an ineffectual policy statement at best.
Finally, the Clinton administration has been instrumental in urging the
importance of the issue of sacred site protection. Specifically, it has issued
two executive orders. In May 1996, following a 1994 Order that directed
federal land managers to consult with Native American nations as with
sovereign nations, President Clinton issued Executive Order 13,007,
mandating that federal agencies "shall, to the extent practicable, permitted by
law, and not clearly inconsistent with agency functions, (1) accommodate
access to and ceremonial use of Indian sacred sites by Indian religious
practitioners and (2) avoid adversely affecting the physical integrity of sacred
sites. '"" In her law review article on sacred site protection, Lydia Grimm
assessed the Order's impact:
100. 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1994).
101. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protection Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 471 (1988)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).




While section l(a)(1) restates the principles already applicable to
agencies via AIRFA, section 1(a)(2) adds something new by
focusing agencies on the physical integrity of the sites. Requiring
agencies to avoid harming the physical integrity of sacred sites
helps close a gap left by AIRFA, since providing access to sacred
sites is virtually meaningless if the site itself is not protected from
damage."°
Grimm goes on to say, however, that the language of the Order is "cautious"
because of the inescapable issue that there will always be uncertainty in
Establishment Clause law, and that there is simply no such thing as a clear-cut
solution." As such, she urges the passage of a general sacred lands statute.
B. What Could Be Done - Legislative Proposal
The relative shortcomings of these current laws accentuate this need for
such general sacred site legislature. However, the myriad practical difficulties
of drafting general sacred site legislature which strikes the constitutionally
appropriate Establishment Clause balance between accommodation and
entanglement presents a daunting task. The Senate found that out in 1994
when its proposed Native American Cultural Protection and Free Exercise of
Religion Act failed to pass, due in large part to Establishment Clause concerns
over its constitutionality.
Responding to decisions like Lyng, the Native American Cultural Protection
and Free Exercise of Religion Act of 1994 (the Act) developed several key
sections attempting to deal with sacred site protection. Noting that AIRFA's
general policy statement has been ineffective in its application to federal land
managers, Senator Inouye's report lays out the basic intended effects of
Title I of the Act, Protection of Sacred Sites:
There are currently over 44 Native American sacred sites that are
threatened by tourism, development and resource exploitation.
Title I of the bill provides for the protection of Native American
sacred sites that are located on public lands. Although the original
bill provided only for the protection of the sites themselves, the
Interior Department urged that the bill extend protection to the
traditional cultural and religious practices associated with such
sites, and this approach is adopted in S. 2269 as amended.
The framework of the original bill established a process that
would enable Indian tribes and federal agencies to enter into
consultation if a Native American sacred site was to be
103. Grimm, supra note 9, at 25.
104. Id. Grimm says that the "to the extent practicable," language "reveals some uncertainty
about agency efforts, and authority, to protect sacred lands." Ma
105. S. REP. No. 103-411, at 2 (1994).
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detrimentally affected by a federal undertaking - following the
model of the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA).... The
consultation process that is contained in S. 2269, as amended,
provides for notice to affected tribes and Native Hawaiian
organizations when a covered federal activity may have an
adverse impact on a Native American sacred site. In turn, the
affected tribes or Native Hawaiian organizations must notify the
federal agency of their desire to enter into a consultation process
to assure that all viable alternatives to the potential adverse impact
to a sacred site are given consideration. If there is no alternative
other than to adversely affect a sacred site, the government bears
the burden of establishing that there are no less restrictive means
and that proceeding with the activity serves a compelling
governmental interest."
In drafting Title I of the Act, Senator Inouye states that there was extremely
close attention paid to the Establishment Clause issues raised by the proposed
bill. However, he notes, not without a great deal of irony, that the federal
government has been excessively entangled in Native American religions
throughout the history of its federal-tribal relationship. This is a very clear
indictment of the very same government that is concerned with ensuring that
sacred site protection legislature does not violate the Establishment Clause.' °'
Based upon the history of federal oppression of the Native American
people, coupled with the lack of "clear guidelines in prior rulings of the
Supreme Court as to how a statute that is designed to remedy a past and
pervasive pattern of discrimination would be construed within the context of
First Amendment jurisprudence,""m Senator Inouye explains how the drafters
of the proposed bill came up with their proposed solution:
S. 2269 was drafted with these distinctions in mind: (1) that the
federal government's discrimination against Native American
traditional cultural and religious practices was exercised against
individuals and did not follow a line defined by the federally-
nrognized tribal status; and (2) that protections afforded to the
tiaditional cultural and religious practices of native peoples,
including California Indians and Native Hawaiians, must be
extended within a cultural context. The definitions contained in
S. 2269 are designed to draw these distinctions so that the
remedial nature or the statute might rest upon a constitutionally
permissible foundation.Y
106. Id. at 5-6.
107. Id. at 7.





In lieu of the lack of clear Supreme Court guidance on the issue, Senator
Inouye's report concluded that this bill, as amended, was sufficient to pass
constitutional muster.
Unfortunately for the Act, both the Justice Department and the Department
of Interior disagreed, and eventually the final vote of the Senate did as well.
In the same Senate Report, both the Justice and the Interior Departments
articulated their concerns about the amended bill. To their credit, both lauded
the purposes behind the Act, and stated that they hoped all involved groups
could work together in order to craft a constitutionally sound final product.
Both, however, were concerned about the Supreme Court's decision in Board
of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District v. Grumet,"' which
"looked behind" the structure of a town created for its "cultural"
independence, in order to conclude that the principles behind the separate
community was "religious," and thus violative of the Establishment
Clause."' Moreover, the Justice Department anticipated Equal Protection
problems as well, with regard to those tribes not federally recognized, and
thus not able to benefit from the federal-tribal relationship, a relationship
between two sovereigns.'
The Justice Department read Kiryas Joel to invalidate Senate Bill 2269
because the shift from "religious" protection to "cultural" protection was a
leap that the Supreme Court was simply not willing to buy."3 Such matters
of syntax did not, in the eyes of the Justice Department, forestall an
Establishment Clause violation. The Justice Department also made suggestions
as to the burdens of proof, and the definition of "federal lands." The Act
failed to pass the Senate, and it appears clear that the biggest stumbling block
it encountered was the Establishment Clause."
4
The Act's history underscores the difficulty of drafting such general sacred
site protection legislature. While it may be convenient to adopt the simple
position that there can be no progress until a general statute is successfully
110. 512 U.S. 687 (1994).
111. S. REP. No. 103-411, at 27. In Kiryas Joel, a separate school district established for
the sole use of members of an Hasidic sect was found to have "religious" principles at its core.
The Court was not convinced by the argument that the community was secular, rather than
religious.
112. l. at 28. The Justice Department cited Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974), in
urging that similar protections would only attach to the Native American tribes that were federally
recognized.
113. S. REP. No. 103-411, at 29 (1994).
114. See, e.g., Winslow, supra note 13, at 1293. Winslow states,
Legislative history suggests that the chief pitfall to the sacred site bill was the
Establishment Clause to the First Amendment. Traditionally, the Establishment
Clause has proscribed laws that have a religious purpose or effect or which
excessively entangle the government with religion, ant the sacred-site bill was
questioned as promoting religion.
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enacted, it is abundantly clear that such statute does not seem to be possible
in the near future. The "Catch-22" at work here is that there is the need for
a general sacred lands statute because of the Supreme Court's lack of direct
precedent concerning the Establishment Clause and sacred sites, yet that need
seems fated to remain unsatisfied because of the mandates of the
Establishment Clause which cause such proposed bills to fail. Until the
Supreme Court rules on sacred site issues - and the hope is that the appeal
of Bear Lodge makes it that far - commentators have thus focused their
attention to making the most out of the current Establishment Clause
jurisprudence on the books today.
C. What Could Be Done - Law Review Proposals
Two proposed solutions to this inability to enact constitutional general
sacred site legislation come from separate law review articles. Recognizing
the immense difficulty in crafting a constitutionally sound general statute, both
draw heavily upon their own perceptions of how the Establishment Clause's
mandates should be interpreted. Professor Raymond Cross urges a doctrine
mindful of the federal trust relationship, with review of public land managers'
decisions under a rational basis standard."' And Anastasia Winslow proffers
her own solution, drawing simply on a different interpretation of existing
caselaw."6
Initially, Professor Cross makes a point that appears to indirectly counter
the Department of Justice's concern about Kiryas Joel. Utilizing Judge
Downes' initial ruling on the temporary injunction in Bear Lodge, Professor
Cross argues that Judge Downes uncritically classifies the Lakota Sun Dance
ceremony as religious, rather than cultural, without fully assessing the
situation. Drawing upon Professor Jesse Choper's definition of a religious
action as one which is intended to have extratemporal consequences, Professor
Cross argues that the Sun Dance ceremony is "fundamentally non-
commemorative in character and non-salvation directed."". As such,
Professor Cross argues that the distinction between "cultural" and "religious"
does, in fact, pass constitutional muster under the Establishment Clause. In
fact, Professor Cross' analysis of Bear Lodge can be read as an effective
counterargument to the Justice Department's concern over the Kiryas Joel
logic:
Judge Downes' interpretation of the "religious activity" and
"governmental coercion" elements of the Establishment Clause
threatens the Framers' dual commitment to a principle of religious
tolerance and a vibrant sphere of private religious activity. Native
115. Cross & Brenneman, supra note 7, at 44.
116. Winslow, supra note 13.




American ceremonial activities at Devils Tower, regarded by
expert ethnographers as primarily culturally affiliative activities,
are uncritically swept up into his definition of religious
activity."'
Moreover, Judge Downes' recent ruling in April of 1998 in favor of the
Native Americans seems to vindicate Professor Cross' position.
From that conclusion, Professor Cross crafts a two-pronged "alternative
framework" with which to approach sacred site protection issues in light of
the events at Bear Lodge:
This framework has two elements: 1) Legal: The public land
managers' duty to preserve Native Americans' right of cultural
access should be scrutinized under the rational basis test declared
by the Supreme Court in Delaware Tribal Business Comm. v.
Weeks, [430 U.S. 73 (1977)] and 2) Policy: Judicial review of
federal agencies' actions to preserve Native Americans' right of
cultural access or cultural resources should be limited to the
court's assessment of the agency's asserted rational nexus between
the identified Native American cultural resource and its proposed
action that will preserve that resource from potential destruction
or unacceptable injury by a competing use."'
Under Professor Cross' legal element, he stresses the federal trust relationship
which binds the federal government to preserve Native American cultural
resources. This trust doctrine is best enforced when public land managers are
allowed to fully exercise the discretion they have in making decisions that
concern cultural resources on federal public lands. The federal government's
power to enforce the trust relationship with the various tribes comes from the
plenary power, which is subject only to rational basis scrutiny." As such,
actions taken by federal land managers, such as those taken by Superintendent
Liggett at Bear Lodge, will be upheld under Professor Cross' standard, which
gives great deference to the discretion of the land manager.
Conversely, Anastasia Winslow argues that the current Establishment
Clause rules are, in fact, appropriate, and even helpful to Native American
sacred site protection - if applied properly. She focuses specifically on the
failure of Senate Bill 2269, and the lessons that can be learned in its wake:
A focus of inquiry in this Article is whether sacred-site protection
must depend upon the tribal status of the religious participants,
which was the stumbling block to Senate Bill 2269. Ultimately,
I conclude that modified Establishment Clause rules are
118. Id at42.
119. ld. at 42-43.
120. Id. at 44.
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dangerous, inconsistent with the purpose behind the Establishment
Clause, and should be avoided: the preferred approach is to apply
traditional Establishment Clause rules which, if applied
consistently, should pose no barrier in protecting Native American
sacred sites. But in any event, it is unnecessary and deleterious to
religious freedom to limit the scope of religious legislation to
Native American tribal members only, as the government should
have no role in defining or influencing membership criteria for
religious groups, whichever they may be.'
Winslow argues that Senate Bill 2269 was legitimate, and, as Professor Cross
argues as well, that the limitation of protection of federally recognized tribes
only is unneessary.' In fact, Winslow argues that such governmental
classifications of "recognized" or "protected" tribes would be tantamount to
an Establishment Clause violation:
When the government attempts to delineate who may be a
member of a religious group, participate in a religious ceremony,
or receive the full privileges of participating in a religion, it is
implicating itself in religious doctrine. The Establishment Clause
is threatened. There is little religious autonomy if the federal
government may tell Native American tribal members that their
religious beliefs and practices will be protected by law, but their
friends, family, or anyone else not a tribal member who may want
to practice their religions will not be protected.'"
As such, the thrust of Winslow's argument appears to be that though the
Establishment Clause standards articulated by the Supreme Court are, in fact,
appropriate, courts have nonetheless failed to apply them correctly in settings
involving sacred site protection. Judge Downes' latest ruling in Bear Lodge
is an example of what Winslow would consider a proper application of
existing Establishment Clause law.
Regardless of the view one espouses in the area, and realizing that there
is far fr'om one clear-cut legislative or judicial solution to the sacred site
protection issue, the future appears to be uncertain. Though the latest ruling
in Bear Lodge is encouraging for Native Americans, enough other sacred site
context; are presently ripening, ready to unleash new and challenging factual
settings upon our courts' Establishment Clause domain. Anticipation of these
key situations prepares one for future challenges of sacred site protection as
we await the final outcome of the Bear Lodge litigation.
121. Winslow, supra note 13, at 1294.
122. Id. at 1342. Winslow argues that limiting protection to federally recognized tribes
"would tend to influence membership criteria and intrude upon the autonomy of religious groups,
actions which are inconsistent with Congress' obligations toward Native American tribes." Id.




IX. The Future of Bear Lodge - Specific Contexts in Which to Evaluate
Proposed Solutions
A handful of other sacred sites, all located in the Western United States,
present situations in which issues raised by Bear Lodge, Lyng, and other cases
may lead to new litigation. At Bighorn Medicine Wheel in northern
Wyoming, the Forest Service, after hearing Native American concerns over
tourist interference with the sacred site, abandoned all tourism expansion
plans. The Forest Service currently maintains the site as a sacred, traditional
site."4 Also, several summers ago, NPS officials closed the "great kiva"
located at Chaco Culture National Historic Park after Native Pueblos and
Navajos complained of desecration by tourists."z In the spring of 1996, in
Santa Fe, New Mexico, "a regional Forest Service official overturned a local
agency decision approving a ski area expansion onto a mountain considered
sacred by some Native Americans.""'L At Bandelier National Monument in
New Mexico, "park rangers are now keeping secret the location of Lions'
Shrine, two volcanic rocks carved into the shape of lions," a shrine sacred to
the Cochiti Pueblo, after the shrine was being littered with strange
offerings.'" Finally, the Alliance to Protect Native Americans in National
Parks was formed by members of the Timbisha Shoshone tribe in order to
stake a claim for their land located in Death Valley National Park. That
Alliance has grown with the addition of the Miccosukees of Florida's
Everglades National Park, the Hualapais near the Grand Canyon National
Park, and the Navajo Nation, with several more tribes currently expressing
interest."
The outcome of the Bear Lodge suit is being monitored by more than a
few interested parties. "William Perry Pendley of the Mountains States Legal
Foundation says that if his group wins this case, there could be more lawsuits.
Potential plaintiffs are the Santa Fe Ski Area, climbers who were denied
access to Cave Rock near Lake Tahoe and tourists wanting to walk under
Rainbow Bridge."'" One area in particular, however, is particularly
compelling. Rainbow Bridge, a Navajo sacred site in Utah. One of the things
that makes Rainbow Bridge's case so interesting is the less than definitive
history behind its sacred status, as well as the fact that "there is no single,
organized Indian group pushing for the changes at Rainbow Bridge." '






130. Id. Several stories exist as to the site's sacredness: "One explanation comes from a
Hopi story about the "sipapu" - a gateway through which the souls of people come out of the
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Located on a national park, Rainbow Bridge, the world's largest stone arch,
is being regulated by the NPS. Signs, as well as park rangers, encourage
visitors to the park not to walk underneath the bridge, in response to Navajo
complaints that tourists were desecrating the sacred site by walking
underneath it.'3' Specifically, the signs near the bridge read: "American
Indians consider Rainbow Bridge a sacred religious site. Please respect these
long-standing beliefs. Please do not approach or walk under Rainbow
Bridge."'" More importantly, in the past few months, the park officials
added the word "voluntarily" to these signs. ' The NPS measures are
voluntary in nature, encouraging visitors to refrain from other distracting
activities, such as sunbathing, listening to music, and climbing on the rocks.
Park Rangers might stop visitors to explain the religious significance of the
site, but they cannot forbid visitors from walking under the arch, nor punish
them for doing so.
Badoni v. Higginson involved Rainbow Bridge and dealt with the fact that
Navajos 'believe if humans alter the Earth in the area of the bridge, [tribal]
prayers will not be heard by the gods, and their ceremonies will be ineffective
to prevent evil and disease.""' Already, there are rumblings of discontent
over the signs at Rainbow Bridge, as well as over the voluntary NPS request
of tourists not to walk under the arch - the "Natural Arch and Bridge
Society" has already informed the NPS of their displeasure with the measures.
Despite these complaints, Superintendent Joe Alston, in charge of maintaining
Rainbow Bridge, argues that the voluntary request and the signs are just as
valid as those measures undertaken at'Bear Lodge:
Fundamentally, there will always be an inherent conflict between
the large number of people coming to Rainbow Bridge and how
Native Americans view it.... What we're trying to present is the
whole story, not just the Anglo side of it, but also the Native
American perspective of what this place is and what it means to
them.1
35
Alston is trying to balance tribal demands asking for a ban on all non-Indian
visitors to the arch with those of the tourists who claim that even a voluntary
underworld and eventually return to it. The legend goes that the souls of all humans were shut
up in the Earth until the animals, learning of the imprisonment, began digging. First Coyote and
finally a badger dug a cavelike hole deep enough to release the souls. When the Earth is done
with them, the souls must return through the archlike gateway, leading to speculation that natural
bridges may represent to American Indians the doorway between life and death."
131. Ld.
132. Id.
133. Smith, supra note 72.





request to stay away from the arch is reverse discrimination, forcing them to
respect the Native American faith.
Applying the tests proposed by Cross and Winslow to the Rainbow Bridge
problem, I would argue that the Park Service measures implemented there are
just as constitutional as those upheld by Judge Downes in the most recent
Bear Lodge decision. The arguments on both sides would likely mirror those
in Bear Lodge in many respects.
Under the first prong of Professor Cross' test, the Park Service's desire to
preserve Native American cultural access is consistent with the duty owed to
Native Americans by the federal government under the federal-tribal trust
relationship. Given the disagreement over the legends of the arch, there may
be some difficulty in establishing the precise nature of the site's sacred
qualities. However, it is unquestionable that there are significant sacred
qualities to the arch, and there is cultural impact due to the tourists'
interference with the sacred site. Bearing in mind that, like Bear Lodge, the
policies enacted by the Park Service at Rainbow Bridge are voluntary, it
seems clear that such actions would survive rational basis scrutiny. Professor
Cross' second prong reflects the notion of a statutory duty to preserve Native
American cultural resources.
In light of the most recent Bear Lodge decision, Winslow's test is a
straightforward application of existing Establishment Clause doctrine that
appears to produce a constitutional result. Under the Lemon test, the secular
purposes include accommodation, recreation management, and environmental
protection. The voluntary nature of the signs and of the request to refrain
from walking under the bridge is just that - voluntary. Those who choose
not to respect the Native American sacred site may do so, and are allowed to
walk under the bridge without punishment. As such, the measures do not
advance religion. They merely make all visitors to the park aware of the
religious significance of the bridge to the Navajo people. And finally,
excessive government entanglement is not fostered, given that the voluntary
request does not require nor allow park rangers to detain or punish those who
choose to walk under the bridge. Rather, the measures set up are of an
educational nature, allowing each visitor to appraise himself or herself of the
entire situation, and then make the conscious decision to either respect or fail
to respect the wishes of the Native Americans who hold Rainbow Bridge
sacred.
Under Justice Kennedy's coercion test, there is room for an argument that
the measures create an environment that coerces visitors to the park to respect
the Native American religious beliefs. However, such an argument appears
to be weakened again by the voluntary nature of the measures. The addition
of "voluntarily" to the signs near the bridge makes it clear that it is still one's
own decision whether or not to obey its request. Potential challenges to the
Rainbow Bridge measures would likely appear to be most effective under a
coercion test argument. Those arguing against the policies might argue that
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the signs, coupled with rangers patrolling the park encouraging people to
respect the edicts of the signs, does in fact amount to coercion. However,
despite what courts might perceive as the somewhat appealing nature of this
claim on its face, it is rendered wholly ineffective by the voluntary nature of
the requests. Those who backed this coercion argument would be arguing that
not a single visitor to the park has neither the ability nor the individuality to
make a decision for himself or herself. To do so would insult the intelligence
of those visitors, not to mention that of the court before which the case would
be argued.
Finally, under Justice O'Connor's endorsement test, there is once again no
Establishment Clause problem. The mere presence of signs asking park
visitors to voluntarily choose to respect the religious significance of the
Bridge to the Navajo people does not reasonably cause those visitors to feel
as if the Native Americans are insiders, and the visitors themselves are
outsiders. In fact, by allowing visitors the voluntary choice to respect or to
not respect the Navajo wishes, the government action indirectly respects the
religious preferences of all parties involved. By allowing for such individual
choice, the government action here has clearly not endorsed any one religion
in favor of another.
All eyes will be on the appeal process in Bear Lodge to see where the
future of Native American sacred site protection law will lead. Based upon
the mosit recent ruling in that case, coupled with the analyses of Professor
Cross and Ms. Winslow, it appears that the trend in Native American law is
slowly shifting towards affirmatively mandating sacred site protection on
federal public lands through rubrics of accommodation and of the federal-
tribal trust relationship.
X. Conclusion
[WI]e are still here and we intend to be here for many generations
to come.... People in the larger society need to know some of
this history so that they will stop trying to resurrect failed policies
and learn to accept our permanence as the third kind of sovereign
in our federal system."
This eloquently sums up the need for a more sympathetic view of Native
American culture, and for an increased appreciation of what Native
Americans, as a people, have endured over the course of our nation's history.
It shows that the dominant culture, and in particular that dominant culture's
legal system, must take heed of the unique role of the Native American
people in our national heritage. Moreover, it highlights the special and sacred
136. Dean B. Suagee, Tribal Voices in Historic Preservation: Sacred Landscapes, Cross.




place in which Native Americans place their lands in their respective
worldviews. Accordingly, we must seek to defend their ways of life and be
simultaneously guided and constrained by the Constitution in doing so. We
must be cognizant of the fundamentally conflicting belief and value systems
which underscore the Native American and Anglo-American ways of life,
respectively. In doing so, we can begin to accord Native American faiths the
respect and dignity they deserve, as mandated by the principle of
accommodation under the Establishment Clause.
In an even broader sense, our respect of Native American sacred site rights
under the Establishment Clause can be channeled into a stronger sense of
respect for all lands:
By focusing some of our attention on the ways that particular
tribal cultures relate to the natural world and the ways in which
they explain these relationships, we can help people in the larger
American society come to a fuller understanding of the
relationships between human societies and the natural world. In
doing so, we can help them become better practitioners of a
concept that non-Indian environmentalists might call
"stewardship."'3
In honoring the Native Americans' sense of the sanctity of the land, only good
can come of a policy that stresses such respect and preservation of our entire
nation's precious land.
Regardless of one's position on the issue, it is absolutely critical that one
honor and respect the dignity and vitality of the Native American faith and
heritage. Bob Archibald, a rock climber sympathetic to the Native American
argument in Bear Lodge, touches upon this necessity: 'How would you like
it if someone came into your church while services were going on and threw
a party? What this is about is respect."'35 That respect can be said to be
owed both to the Native Americans, as well as to the mandates of the federal
government's trust relationship with the Native Americans.' At the very
least, one can be cognizant of the original intent of the Framers in crafting the
Establishment Clause, and respect the Native American claims to various
tracts of public land. At best, one can fully embrace Justice Brennan's
description of Native American faith, weighing it very heavily in considering
the rights of Native Americans to sacred site protection on federal public
137. Id. at 160.
138. Snyder, supra note 56. Incidentally, it appears that the vast majority of climbers at
Devil's Tower are respecting the voluntary ban on June climbing, and staying away from the site
during that month.
139. Smith & Manning, supra note 6. Specifically, regarding the trust relationship, the
authors state: "Robert Allan, an attorney for the Navajo Nation's Division of Natural Resources,
believes legal precedents for exclusive access to sacred sites can be found in cases involving the
federal government's trust responsibility to tribes." Id.
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lands: "The site-specific nature of Indian religious practices derives from the
Native American perception that land is itself a sacred, living being.""
140. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protection Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 461 (1988)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
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